Romantic Circles Blog

Maroon Resistance, White Violence, and Romanticism’s Envy of Black Freedom

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Kerry Sinanan, University of Texas at San Antonio

Since the murder of George Floyd on 25 May 2020, and the subsequent global Black Lives Matter protests, police violence and hate crimes in the US against Black people have continued, unabated. As Stacey Patton wrote on 22 June, drawing words Billie Holiday made famous, “America’s trees are bearing a strange and bitter fruit—dead black bodies.” Tragically, the list of the names of African Americans recently found hanging from trees keeps growing:

May 31: Malcolm Harsch 38, Victorville, California.
June 9: Dominique Alexander, 27, Manhattan, New York.
June 10: Robert Fuller, 24, Palmdale, California.
June 17: unnamed boy, 17, Spring, Texas.

Although Malcolm Harsch’s death has now been accepted as suicide by his family, they initially feared he had met the same fate as “thousands of blacks who were lynched." On Tuesday 16 June, the attorney for Robert Fuller’s family, Jamon R. Hicks, explicitly linked the hangings to the practice of lynching: “For African-Americans in America, hanging from a tree is a lynching. Why was this cavalierly dismissed as a suicide and not investigated as a murder?” Many see these hangings as a punishment for Black Lives Matter protests and calls to abolish the police. As Patton asserts, “These recent incidents do follow the historical pattern of displaying black bodies publicly to intimidate black communities.” Since these deaths, nooses have been found hanging from trees in Oakland, California, Harlem, New York, Las Vegas, and elsewhere.

The June 1 anniversary of the Tulsa massacre in 1921 reminded us of this pattern of extreme violence as a response to Black articulations of independence and freedom. As Karlos K. Hill writes, “[T]he Tulsa Massacre was not an exceptional event. Over the course of American history, more than 250 episodes of collective white violence against black communities have occurred.” Just as Tulsa was a punishment for Black achievement, recent hangings can be seen as a punishment for further Black success: the peaceful, ongoing, mass protests against police brutality and systemic racism in every US state, especially because many non-Black people have joined to push for real changes that might prevent the ongoing death of Black people. This success, albeit only partial at this point, still marks a real shift: BLM in 2020 has, as Blair L.M. Kelley states, “raised the floor of what’s possible” as evidenced by the Minneapolis City Council recently voting to abolish its police department and replace it with community-led programs.

White supremacy’s reassertion of itself in response to Black resistance must be situated in the context of slavery’s legacies. As Christina Sharpe asserts, “chattel slavery continues to animate the present.” The long history of white violence begins with Caribbean slave revolts. The brutal punishment of rebellion on slave plantations aimed to obliterate Black freedom and recuperate liberty according to colonial norms. When enslaved people, as Olaudah Equiano testifies, “still retain so much of their human nature about them as to wish to put an end to their misery, and retaliate on their tyrants,” they were most viciously punished. Equiano details the extremity of white violence tolerated by slave laws: “I was present when a poor fellow was tied up and kept hanging by the wrists at some distance from the ground, and then some half hundred weights were fixed to his ancles, in which posture he was flogged most unmercifully.” The lynchings that we see now have clear precedents in the kind of “hanging” that Equiano painfully details. This long history of excessive white violence tells us something clearly: it was, in fact, slave rebellion and Maroon resistance that articulated the freedom par excellence that white Romanticism claimed, and continues to claim, as its own.

John Stedman’s Narrative of a Five Years Expedition against the Revolted Negroes of Surinam (1796) presents a record of the legalized brutality that the white Dutch colonists in Suriname visited on enslaved people and Maroons. Maroon wars in Suriname would be a thorn in the Dutch side for decades after the British ceded Suriname in 1667. The colony frequently lost slaves to the dense forests as they freed themselves. By the early 1770s Suriname’s Governor Nepveu asked for more troops and Stedman arrived as a paid mercenary for the Dutch with the rank of Captain. The battles he participated in were part of “The First Boni War” (1765-77). He witnessed mutilations and maimings, and represented them in words and images. An engraving by William Blake based on a sketch by Stedman, A Negro hung alive by the Ribs to a Gallows, shows why parts of his Narrative became powerful Romantic-era abolitionist tracts, despite Stedman’s own preference for amelioration. He accompanies this gruesome image with transcribed testimony from a white spectator: “I saw a black man hang’d alive by the ribs, between which with a knife was first made an incision, and then clinch’d [by] an Iron hook with a Chain. . . .” Here, violence is deliberately staged as a spectacle to crush Black resistance. The pronouncement of the punishment to be given to the rebel Saramaka Maroon, Joosie, in 1730 shows that the language of the colonial judiciary institutionalized extreme white violence as a response to resistance:

[He] shall be hanged from the gibbet by an Iron Hook through his ribs, until dead; his head shall then be severed and displayed on a stake . . . As for the Negroes Wierrie and Manbote, they shall be bound to a stake and roasted alive over a slow fire, while being tortured with glowing Tongs. The Negro girls . . . will be tied to a cross to be broke alive . . .

The terms of present-day lynching, licensing white violence as a response to Black freedom, are established in the legal sentencing of the slave colony.

William Blake, A Negro hung alive by the Ribs to a Gallows

William Blake, A Negro hung alive by the Ribs to a Gallows

Stedman’s position is deeply compromised: he sympathizes with Maroons and enslaved people, but maintains his belief in white power, even while he lambasts it as corrupt. Ultimately, his Narrative became a powerful argument against his stated ameliorationist position. Stedman reveals that the spectacle of the mangled and lynched Maroon rebel’s body serves specifically to dehumanize Black rebellion, just as today’s lynchings attempt to punctuate BLM protests for freedom with a punishing end that reinstates white power. We must reject this white teleology.

In his conclusion, Stedman admits that the

Acts of Barbarity I have so frequently Related through out this Work, are Assuredly Sufficient to melt the Heart of the most unfeeling with Compassion, nor is it to be Wondered that Armies of Rebels at every Hazard Assemble in the forest to Seek Revenge & Liberty[.]

The justified resistance of the Maroons makes Stedman’s loyalty to white power untenable, forcing him to acknowledge that liberty is their domain.

From Stedman’s journals to now, then, the lynched Black body is produced by white failure. Black emancipation remains extraneous, “in the forest,” physically and philosophically, ironically figuring what Romanticism would like to imagine of itself. Francesco Bartolozzi’s engraving for Stedman, A Rebel Negroe Armed and on his Guard, presents an alternative image of Black resistance: competent, whole, free, running out of the print’s frame. White power needs the spectacle of the lynched Black body to forge its own ties of kinship, but nevertheless envies Black resistance, figured by the running Maroon, who remains persistently, subversively outside the imposed borders of white violence. 

Francesco Bartolozzi, A Rebel Negroe Armed and on his Guard

Francesco Bartolozzi, A Rebel Negroe Armed and on his Guard

RC Unbound Issue No.: 


Uprising, or “a kind of manna”

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Lenora Hanson, NYU

George Floyd was murdered over a “(potentially) counterfeit” bill used to purchase cigarettes at a convenience store—for getting something he needed. (In 2014, Eric Garner was selling cigarettes “fraudulently.” Rayshard Brooks was murdered for idling in a fast-food drive-thru.) It does not matter whether that bill was counterfeit or not. Its “potential” was the contingent event that became the condition of structural violence in which no event is allowed to remain contingent. That this bill can be suspected as “counterfeit” exposes a scene that always must be secured by the police. This is a scene in which the fraudulence of money’s “universal equivalence” threatens to be exposed for what it has always been—a false border between those designated to die and those designated to live inside or outside of property. “Counterfeit” money is always a tautology, a repetition of sameness.  It requires brutal surveillance to preserve its fiction. One of these fictions is that the origins of money as we know it never involved the exchange of persons. But another is that the surplus of needs and dependencies that define human life could ever be reduced to the sameness of exchange. Such enforced sameness is the real counterfeit, the contra-facere, that has been made against those needs that will always exceed exchange, and in so doing always refer back to the creation of universal equivalence through slavery. The looting that followed Floyd’s murder, and the murders of so many others before him, rescinds the false equivalence that necessitates murder to retain its border. In this sense, recent riots affirm and perform the action for which Floyd was murdered—getting something that he needed without reducing that need to sameness.

Uprisings that take the form of looting are, as Amanda Armstrong reminds us, always already racialized and global. Looting, a nineteenth-century English translation of the Hindi verb lut (to rob), is the refusal of an everyday exchange that remains inseparable from the chains that make such equivalence possible. Living outside the counterfeit of equivalence has a history, but one that runs counter to the equation between sameness, self-possession, and freedom. In his Treatise on Sugar (1799), Benjamin Moseley generates a science of this sameness, weeding through the unruly roots of sugar in an attempt to isolate a pure history separate from a surplus of things that can be used to sweeten: “the maple, the birch, the red beet, the parsnip, the grape, wheat, and etc.” Against this surplus of sweetness, Moseley’s science seeks to establish the sugar cane as a proper and proprietary object that can justify the difference between Europeans and Africans, and thus secure slavery as a world-historical agricultural endeavor. For Moseley, it was a brutal fact of nature that Africans had to be enslaved in order for this thing to become an item of exchange. Without it, the needs of laboring populations in Europe could never have been met. But the Treatise provides another science that routes us back through India and to Floyd’s “theft.” This other science is a kind of looting, a satisfaction met against equivalence. According to Moseley, Arabs did not understand the production of sugar by Indians. Rather, “they thought it was the dew, which, falling on the Indian canes, concreted: and that it was a kind of manna.” Moseley assumes that, without the knowledge of commodities, these non-Europeans thought that sugar simply fell from heaven, without a proper history. A misunderstanding of the brutal counterfeit of commodities is always imputed to others who obtain what they need in different ways. In this other science, the cops would never be called. Which is why looting, counterfeiting, and stealing –all ways of living outside of exchange—had to be created as crimes at the same time that humans were exchanged and insured as property.

Meeting one’s needs outside of the strictly policed boundary between equivalence and non-equivalence is no mere economic phenomenon. Joshua Clover has recently argued that riots and looting are the actions of those dispossessed from access to the wage, a dispossession that is deeply racialized. But getting what one needs through means that mock a counterfeit equivalence, as in the case of riots, also reminds us that race denotes a surplus of ways of getting things otherwise and of other modes of circulation. One aspect of enslavement, then, was a separation which took centuries of law-making to realize and enforced the identification of race with non-equivalence in a strictly juridical mode. George Floyd was killed under this condition that the condition of slavery produced—a condition that demands the deadly securitization of a counterfeit equivalence.

Slipping a counterfeit for a stolen good made on stolen land by stolen labor—this is a performance of another kind too. It is a way of meeting needs that looks like superstition (“a kind of manna”) to a plantation owner and like theft to the police, because they make and enforce a law in which needs cannot be met outside the brutal enforcement of separability through equivalence. Lifting the borders around property—whether through counterfeit bills, Gucci bags, wagons of corn, or street-corner sales—is the continued refusal of false equivalence between our infinite and surplus needs and the ever-deviating ways that they must be met. It draws from a history of refusal of the always deadly sameness of that calculation. Thomas Malthus and Patrick Colquhoun and John Mill and J.R. McCulloch knew this, and designed theories and policies to distinguish the messiness of needs from the imputed equivalence of wages. Looting undoes that securitized counterfeit, for a moment. To revel in the generative history of that refusal is also to refuse to cover over the vagrancies of needs that have been written, as Saidiya Hartman has shown, as the history of blackness.

To lut, then, is to move across thresholds otherwise secured by cops and the metaphysics of money and to recover an undocumented history of another ordering between needs and their meeting. This movement refuses the passage of needs in their difference through a necessarily securitized-sameness. Moments of looting remind us that no space exists between the tautologies of the state and the securitization of property. Every instance of exchange is not only an enactment of the reality of abstraction in Marx’s sense, where abstraction is lived as the social process of meeting needs through the exchange of money. It is also the everyday transformation of what we need—as the sign of a deeper dispossession that takes the form of interdependence—into a property that can be policed, into a sameness that could only be produced through the difference of slavery.

As a mockery of the false equivalence of exchange, looting performs a defense of black life, passing through Hindi to revel in a global practice of meeting needs otherwise. As Fred Moten writes, “[l]eaving, differing, stealing away, is always under the threat of the interdiction, of protected theft, of mastery’s ‘protected’ right to steal.” The use of counterfeit bills, the lut, the sweet falling of dew—these all undo the tautology that renders every bill counterfeit as a claim to universal sameness. These instances smuggle tautology out of the habit of everyday exchange. From tauto-“the same” and logos “saying,” they turn us to legein, “to say.” Say their names. “To say” derives from the root leg, “to collect, gather” and “to speak,” “to gather words, to pick out words.” These differing repetitions of deviating accumulations—of gleaning against the violence of property—provide figural deviations from a law that, as Sora Han writes, “makes recourse to self-evidence so self-evident that it negates the necessity for judicial review at all.” As movements move forward with the cries of “Defund the Police,” these collected and repeated counterfeits remind us that to truly defund the police we must also undo property at every turn so that, at last, there is nothing to defend.

RC Unbound Issue No.: 


Recap of RC Pedagogies Spring Reading Group on MWS's "The Mortal Immortal," by Holly Hirst

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The spring meeting of the Romantic Circles Pedagogies Reading Group took place on 19th March. Participating were Holly Hirst (Manchester Metropolitan University), Kirstyn Leuner (Santa Clara University) and Dana Van Kooy (Michigan Technical University) looking at Mary Shelley’s 1833 tale ‘The Mortal Immortal’. The tale is narrated by the eponymous ‘mortal immortal’ Winzy, who tells the tale of his own apprenticeship to Cornelius Agrippa, his relationship with his childhood sweetheart Bertha and the elixir that gave him an enduring and possibly immortal bodily life.

Image result for the elixir of life cornelius agrippaThe discussion of the tale revolved around three key questions: the purpose of the narrative, the issue of immortality and the question of love. Our discussion started with a question about the nature and the purpose of the narrative. While clearly a first person narrative, it is not clear to what extent it is a journal, a letter or more generally intended for public rather than private consumption. Comparisons can be drawn between the narrative technique of ‘Mortal Immortal’ and the journal style stories to be found in journals like Blackwoods in the period but also, more directly, to the confessional narratives of Frankenstein (1818) or the found ‘manuscript’ of The Last Man (1826). Each of these comparisons suggests a potentially  unknown but implied reader. The question remains, however, of the purpose for which the text was written. Our discussion covered a number of possibilities and highlighted the tension between the reasons expressed in the first and last paragraphs of the tale.

Winzy begins by claiming,

I will tell my story, and my reader shall judge for me. I will tell my story, and so contrive to pass some few hours of a long eternity, become so wearisome to me.

This emphasis on the dual aims of relating his story for exterior judgement and passing time has been overwritten by the end of the narrative with far more ambitious aims.

Before I go, a miserable vanity has caused me to pen these pages. I would not die, and leave no name behind. Three centuries have passed since I quaffed the fatal beverage: another year shall not elapse before, encountering gigantic dangers--warring with the powers of frost in their home--beset by famine, toil, and tempest--I yield this body, too tenacious a cage for a soul which thirst for freedom, to the destructive elements of air and water--or, if I survive, my name shall be recorded as one of the most famous among the sons of men. (My emphasis)

The emphasis on simply his tale has been overwritten by a desire for monumentalisation, his tale as monument, betraying a thirst both for fame and meaning. Emphasis is placed on the idea of his ‘name’ surviving here but the question consistently in the discussion was to what extent the tale fulfils that function. We receive very little information about Winzy, with Agrippa and Bertha being more important foci of the narrative and receiving through it a form of immortality. Image result for authorWinzy’s name is eclipsed by theirs and his history is empty as the tale contains little information about who he was as an individual. Is the story then an attempt by Winzy to discover himself and a name worth leaving behind? Or does it simply betray the ‘miserable vanity’ of his desire, erasing his individual identity as it attempts to construct it? There is also an interesting overlap between Winzy’s lack of identity and the author’s. The title page tells us this story was written by the ‘writer of Frankenstein’. Mary Shelley’s name is eclipsed by a title as Winzy’s name is eclipsed by a title – the mortal immortal. Our discussion tied this into the discourse on authorship of the time, noting the emphasis on titles rather than names in the cases of, for example, Joanna Baillie and Walter Scott and contrasting it with the emphasis on authorial authority in Wordsworth.  Titles, in the case of ‘The Mortal Immortal’ and both its narrator and author, erase names and the individuals behind them.

Our discussion moved onto the idea of narratorial control. Winzy writes his own narrative and thus, in a sense, attempts control of his own story. He is, therefore, an unusual case of an immortal exercising agency over their own immortality. We drew parallels throughout with Mary Shelley’s collation and editorship of Percy’s work and the way in she effectively made or created him as an author. His immortality was defined by the nameless mortal. We also compared this desire for narrative control with Shelley’s other works, Frankenstein and The Last Man. In Frankenstein, of course, we hear a melange of voices seeking authorial control. In The Last Man, with its curious narratorial construction of travellers in the 18th century finding a scattered Sybelline prophecy detailing the last days of the last man, we find a helpless lack of control dressed as control. Both strategies can be potentially traced in ‘The Mortal Immortal’.

Our discussion, by this point, had branched into the topic of immortality and the obviously negative reflections on immortality represented within Winzy’s account. Immortality is essentially loneliness for Winzy. Despite his marriage he reminds isolated, missing an equal, a partner or someone simply on the same bodily trajectory as himself. Image result for manfred byronLonely and afraid of death, this very fear drives him from people because while he is fairly sure about the slowness, if not non-existence, of his own decay, he cannot be assured of his immunity to violent or sudden death. He seems driven by a will to exile, similar to that found in Byronic narratives such as ‘Manfred’ and in direct opposition to Lionel’s desperate search for company in The Last Man; beyond Bertha, he makes no attempt to seek any other form of human company or integration with the world. (Throughout I made incessant references to the Highlander movie, which, I maintain, offers an interesting counterpoint: a man in a similar situation who makes all the other choices, including seeking alternate companionship, thus highlighting Winzy’s failure.) In his account, we find a solipsism. His intent focus on his own journey and his attempt to understand himself have cut him off from the greater population.  He addresses no other problems or wider issues in his narrative, his is not a global or even a national tale, it is an individual one. His concentration is throughout on his own nature and the nature of his immortality. Like Frankenstein’s creature, he is trying to find out what is human in himself, the mortal in his immortality and in what that consists. Is it in language, reason, literacy, speech, historical consciousness, or emotion, particularly love. If so, he, arguably, retains them all but the question remains of whether his immortality has somehow changed him and robbed him of his humanity along with his mortality.

Image result for frankenstein arcticThe nature of both true ‘humanity’ and true immortality are explored in the text. We had already noted the parallels between Winzy and Frankenstein’s creature. In the last paragraph, this resemblance is heightened through his decision to face the arctic wastes where he test the limits of his own immortality. However the expedition results, however, he will seek death and, conversely, true immortality:

If I survive, my name shall be recorded as one of the most famous among the sons of men; and, my task achieved, I shall adopt more resolute means, and, by scattering and annihilating the atoms that compose my frame, set at liberty the life imprisoned within, and so cruelly prevented from soaring from this dim earth to a sphere more congenial to its immortal essence.

He seeks an immortality of fame but more importantly an immortality of the soul. To return to the question of the changes that bodily immortality have essentially wrought within him, we received the answer of ‘damnation’. There is an echo here of a common trend within 18th and 19th tales, from Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels to William Godwin’s St Leon or the vampiric tales of the period, which remained more strongly influenced by Eastern Orthodox theologies: an endless life of the body is damnation of the soul. This is, in part, connected to an ongoing theological debate about the interconnectedness of soul and body. In ‘The Mortal Immortal’ there is clear reference to them as distinct entities and the body as a trap for the soul, separating it from both paradise and salvation. We returned again to the concept of the ‘miserable vanity’ of his account and posited the tie here to the existent tensions in his own concept of immortality. While assured of the worthlessness of a bodily immortality and positing the necessity for a free ‘soul’ immortality dependent on death, he remains unable to leave behind the veneration of earthly immortality. His ‘miserable vanity’ is the vanity of his own attempts to create a form of deformed immortality of whose lack of worth he is all too aware.

Image result for vanity personificationConcentrating on this phrase ‘miserable vanity’, however, we were brought back to a slightly differing interpretation of its importance, relating it back to Bertha’s own ‘miserable vanity’. As she ages and Winzy does not she becomes obsessed with the physical signs of aging in, as we decried, a particularly gendered way. We tied the text’s focus on Bertha’s fear and anxiety regarding Winzy’s continuing youth and her own aging process back to the biographical context previously discussed of Mary as Percy’s editor. As Percy remained ever young, made immortal by Mary, unable to age as Wordsworth before him had done into a cranky old conservative. Mary, on the other hand, aged beside his eternal youthful memory. Although speculative, this biographical link was of interest in interpreting Mary’s own negative and gendered portrayal of Bertha’s vanity.

The views of each reader differed significantly in their reading of Bertha (and her vanity). The question centred around the nature of the love between the two characters and the nature of their relationship. Before getting married, Bertha had mocked Winzy for his unwillingness to ‘face the devil’ to attain the riches necessary to marry and had flirted with Albert, the choice of her benefactress. It was his jealousy that drove Winzy to drink the potion, thinking that it would cure him of his love. This series of events was the roots of many of our questions and differing opinions. We were split between a view of pre-marriage Bertha which was largely positive (feisty, independent, opinionated and truly in love with Winzy but frustrated at the delays) and largely negative (coquettish, inconstant, vain). Related imageIn taking the first view, we contend that Bertha changed after marriage into someone more insecure, less rebellious, less independent and worried about the value in her aging body. The question remains, however, at which point this occurs. It is possible to suggest that it begins with the onset of aging, however, we also discussed the point of marriage and proposal as the changing point. The event which leads to marriage (Winzy ‘rescuing’ Bertha as she flees from her benefactress) is brought on by the euphoric effects of the elixir. It is worth noting that we also differed in our interpretation of this event - was Bertha motivated by love at all or a desire to flee and to find refuge (creepily) in his ‘mother’s cot.’  To what extent this relationship was ever about love and to what to what extent this love was equal on both sides is unclear and after this point becomes increasingly murky. The exact effect of the elixir is unclear but Winzt is effectively on drugs, whose exact effect and potency are unclear, and there is also the question of the soul deep changes rendered by the very fact of his immortality. There is, however, an automatic imbalance created in the relationship after the elixir is imbibed– the root, perhaps, of Bertha’s personality change. If, of course, you followed the second reading of Bertha, there is little change and only a consummation of her earlier vanity and concentration on the physical. (Reading against Highlander and its treatment of the relationship tends to push the second reading!)There is an ironic juxtaposition between Winzy’s bodily inability to escape the physical and Bertha’s spiritual inability to escape it – just who exactly is damned by it is, perhaps, unclear.

As the above comment suggests, there is an investigation in the tale of the value of the physical and, more specifically, beauty. Our conversation drew us back here to Chaucer and a comparison with The Wife of Bath in which the question is posited of whether it is better to be young and beautiful forever or loyal. Shelley, perhaps influenced by Chaucer’s tale, of which she was aware, offers a reply of sorts in ‘The Mortal Immortal’ but one which appears to defy the possibility of a correct answer.  We also linked it back to Percy Shelley’s ‘Alastor’ and the question of who we love: Is it the immortal ideal which exists nowhere but in our own minds or the other person, in all their reality, who can never be perfect enough for us. Bertha, at different times in the tale, represents both. In this way, she also reflects Winzy’s changing conception of immortality itself. The images used to convey how he views Bertha (the sparkle in her eyes, the colour of her cheeks) echoes the terminology used in describing the elixir itself. Ironically, he views the object of his love in the same way as the elixir he looked to to cure him of his love. This ambiguous relationship between love and love’s object and the elixir from the very beginning highlights the tensions between immortality and love. Without death life isn’t precious and the question is raised if the preciousness of love fades with it.

Our discussion ended with our investigation of this question and the relationship between love and life. Returning to our earlier questions of the nature of life and the importance of ‘love’ to the definition of human, we discussed whether the elixir made love possible or rather impossible. Is Agrippa’s seemingly deceptive description of the elixir as a cure for love actually the ultimate truth of the potion? Love recurs in Western definitions of humanity from biblical teachings about the importance of ‘love’ both to God (who is love) and to humanity (made in the image of God) to Percy Shelley’s synopsis of human history in Prometheus Unbound.  Love both defines us as human and provides the basis of our immortality – whether in the ‘immortal’ loves of an Eloise and Abelard or in the relationship of love necessary to the salvation of our souls. Love for Winzy is arguably something made possible by the euphoria of early immortality but it cannot survive when the landmarks of mortality are removed, which causes duty (Winzy) and jealousy (Bertha) take the place of authenticity. Alternatively, we could argue that in taking the elixir Winzy rendered himself incapable of human love, which depends on the mortality of both its partners.  Either its preciousness is lost along with life’s own or the love of an immortal being cannot be that of a mortal heart. And yet, it is his love story that fills his narrative as if he, half blind and still seeking the nature of both humanity and immortality, seeks to make his love story his only true chance of both.

It’s never too late to get involved in the discussion. You can access the story here and we welcome comments and further discourse.

- Holly Hirst

RC Pedagogies Spring Reading Group: MWS's "The Mortal Immortal", Apr. 19

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Romantic Circles Pedagogies Spring Reading Group continues its gothic streak and will discuss Mary Shelley's immortal short story "The Mortal Immortal"! We will meet next Thursday, April 19th, at 4pm ET via Zoom.

RSVP here:

Many can attest that our first meeting was lively, great fun, and participants learned a lot from each other. Encore! Those who RSVP will receive an email later this week with instructions for joining the Zoom videoconference chat. We hope you will join us. 

Looking for a copy of the text? There is an electronic edition on Romantic Circles edited by Michael Eberle-Sinatra.

Welcome to the Romantic Circles Pedagogies Reading Group

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Romantic Circles Pedagogies is looking to assemble a porous group of scholars at all levels who want to discuss canonical and emerging texts -- an open, generous, and collegial community of readers and teachers.

Each term, RC Pedagogies will host a virtual reading group on a predetermined text at a set date/time via video-chat on Zoom, an online video-conferencing system (free and easy to use). We envision these events as broadly pedagogical moments for graduate students and established scholars alike who want to increase their own knowledge of the field and/or discover new ways to teach the work. The conversation will welcome those who are reading the text for the first time as well as those who have published extensively on it.

Participants will have the chance to discuss the reading with one another, offer interpretations, and ask questions of the group for about an hour. Each reading group meeting will be kicked-off and mediated by a moderator.

Meetings will be lively, light, open, inclusive, friendly, and hopefully enjoyable occasions for scholars at all stages to think about and converse on the selected text. They will not feature a prepared lecture by the moderator or any invited guest speaker. Our goal is to encourage debate and inquiry among all participants.

Mark Your Calendar:

Our first meeting will take place on January 25 at 4pm ET (1pm PT). We will discuss “The Bride of the Greek Isle” (Felicia Hemans).

Texts and some dates for 2018 are listed below. We welcome suggestions for future readings.

Winter 2018:

Spring 2018:

Summer 2018:

  • Thursday, July 19th; Time TBD
  • Mary Wollstonecraft, Maria; Or, The Wrongs of Woman

Fall 2018:

  • Thursday, October 18th; Time TBD
  • Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship


We hope you will join us!


Shelley declares his atheism in a hotel registry

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A hotel registry entry for the Hôtel de Londres in Chamonix dated 23 July 1816 contains a comment, in Percy Shelley's hand and written in Greek, declaring, "I am a lover of mankind, a democrat and an atheist." The registry document has just resurfaced in the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge, and was recently documented on the library's blog. The circumstances behind the document has also been explored more fully on Graham Henderson's blog. At the latter site, a high resolution image of the registry is available, embedded below:

See both blog posts for an account of the public scandal Shelley's comment provoked. 

Frankenstein Bicentennial Opportunity

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On June 14 and 15, the Brocher Foundation, Arizona State University, Duke University, and the University of Lausanne will host “Frankenstein’s Shadow,” a symposium in Geneva, Switzerland to commemorate the origin of Frankenstein and assess its influence in different times and cultures.  The Center for Science and Imagination at Arizona State University is accepting applications to sponsor one scholar to participate in the event. All allowable, workshop-related travel expenses (e.g., economy round-trip airfare, 2-3 nights in the symposium hotel, transfers, and meals) will be covered.

Additionally, all the pertinent information, including a link to apply,  can be found at

The Shelley-Godwin Archive Releases the Prometheus Unbound fair copy notebooks

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The Shelley Godwin Archive has just announced the release of P.B. Shelley's Prometheus Unbound fair copy notebooks, consisting of Bodleian MSS. Shelley e.1, e.2, and e.3. Details about the new publication can be found in Neil Fraistat's press release, but briefly put, the publication brings new content and functionality to the archive: 

As with our earlier release of the Frankenstein manuscripts, these manuscripts all appear as high quality page images accompanied by full transcriptions, and they are encoded in a schema based upon the Text Encoding Initiative’s guidelines for “Representation of Primary Resources,” enabling researchers, editors, and students to pursue a variety of scholarly investigations. Our encoding captures important aspects of the composition process, tracing the revisionary evolution of primary manuscripts and enabling users to see and search for additions, deletions, substitutions, retracings, insertions, transpositions, shifts in hand, displacements, paratextual notes, and other variables related to the composition process.


For this release, the S-GA team invested in refining the design of the site to improve users’ experience of navigating the rich contents of the Archive. Most notably, the contents of S-GA can all be accessed by Manuscript (with page images ordered by their sequence in the manuscript), or by Work (with page images ordered by their linear sequence in the work, e.g., Acts and scenes). The Frankenstein manuscript page images have been refactored so that they can be accessed in all of the complicated arrangements and rearrangements through which they have descended to us over time.

The notebooks just published also contain fair copies of his lyric poems “Ode to Heaven” and “Misery.—A Fragment,” as well as his draft translation of Plato’s Ion.


The Darwins Reconsidered: A One-Day Colloquium

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This colloquium - looking at both Darwins in connection with literature - will take place at the University of Roehampton (SW London) on 4 September, 2015. For programme of speakers, directions and details of registration, please follow this link:

If you have any queries, please contact one of the organizers, Dr Louise Lee ( or Professor Martin Priestman (